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FOREWORD 
This is the second publication in the series dealing with 
the present agricultural emergency in Iowa. 
The first circular in the series, "The Situation Today,;' 
presented the main facts of the case. The present circu-
lar deals with the causes of the present state of affairs. 
These two circulars will provide the foundation for the 
subsequent publications in this series, which will deal with 
remedial measures. The next circular will deal with the 
voluntary domestic allotment plan. 
The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa 
II. The Causes of the Emergency 
By GEOl'l'REY SDEl'BERD 
The close of the year 1932 finds us in the grip of the worst 
depression in history. Our whole productive and distributive 
machinery seems to be out of gear. Industry is running at 
less than two-thirds capacity,1 a large number of our factories 
are shut down, and 11 million men are out of wi>rk.2 
Agriculture is suffering from a different sort of trouble-
not so much from unemployment and closed factories, as from 
ruinously low prices. The United States index of agricultural 
prices has fallen from 138 (the average from 1925 to 1929) to 
56 in October, 1932.3 This is a decline of 60 percent. On Iowa 
farms, hogs that used to average $9.00 a hundred are selling 
now for $3.00,4 and corn that used to be worth 70 cents a bushel 
is now bringing 10 cents. 
What has brought us to this passf We need to know, be-
cause a clear realization of the way we got into this trouble 
should help us to plan the way out. This depression is not a 
catastrophe of nature, like an earthquake or a tornado. It is 
a man-made affair, the result of our own actions and policies. 
We did not do it intentionally, but somehow in fumbling with 
our economic machinery we pulled the wrong levers and got 
ourselves into trouble. If we can go back and discover what 
we did that was wrong, we will be in a better position to get 
the machinery going again. The way into trouble should give 
us some idea of the way out. · 
H the cause was overproduction, we ought to know it. If it 
was Wall Street, we ought to know that. If it was an unstable 
monetary and banking system, we should get our ideas clear 
as to the defects in that system and prepare to remedy them. 
H it was because we got involved in European financial diffi-
culties, or if there has been something \vrong with our trade 
policies-whatever the reason or reasons, the sooner we chart 
the obscure paths through which we got into this depression, 
the sooner shall we find the way out. 
THE GREAT DECLINE IN THE GENERAL 
COMMODITY PRICE LEVEL 
'Vhat, then,.is the cause, or what are the causes, of the pres-
ent emergency in agriculturet 
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The immediate cause is the devastating decline in the general 
commodity price level that has taken place during the last 
three years. Measured from 1925 to 1929 average levels, the 
general level of wholesale commodity prices in the United 
States has fallen 34 percent, or one-third.'1 Similar declines 
have taken place in the other countries of the world. 
A reduction in the general price level of this magnitude bears 
dpwn with especial force upon agriculture, for two reasons. 
Costs of Distribution Lag 
The first reason is that the costs of distribution from pro-
ducer to consumer do not decline as rapidly as wholesale com-
modity prices. Manufacturers', processors' and retailers' 
wages and rent always fall more slowly than commodity prices; 
freight rates change very slowly (they have remained practi-
cally unchanged since the present depression began). Changes 
in the cost of distribuiion lag so much behind changes in com-
modity prices that the heaviest part of the burden of a decline 
in the general price level is passed back to the producer. 
A simple illustration of this is the way declines in hog prices 
at the central markets are passed back to the producer. It costs 
about 75 cents a hundred pounds (freight and handling 
charges) to ship hogs from central Iowa to Chicago. When the 
price at Chicago declines from $4.00 a hundred to $3.00, the 
farm price in Iowa declines by the same amount, from $3.25 to 
$2.25. The reduction in the Chicago price is one-fourth, while 
the reduction in the Iowa farm price is nearly one-third. In 
this case the full burden of the price decline is passed back to 
the producer. 
Agricultural Production Continues at Full Capacity 
There is a second reason why a major decline in the general 
commodity price level hits agriculture hard. A great price 
decline generally brings on a business depression, and during 
a business depression the general demand for goods and services 
diminishes. 
Many industries react promptly to this situation; they cut 
down their production, in line with the reduction in demand. 
The steel industry, for example, has reduced its present output 
to about 20 percent of its full capacity. In the automobile 
industry production has been cut to about one-third.a Indus-
trial production for the United States as a whole has been cut 
more than a third. :Manufacturers who follow this policy gen-
erally have to accept somewhat lower prices, . and their net 
income usually decljnes still more than their prices. But by. 
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reducing production they avert a large part of the effect of 
reduced demand, passing a major portion of it on to the shoul-
ders of the employees that they discharge. 
This policy is very effective in well organized industries. 
The clearest example is the steel industry, which, by cutting its 
production schedule heavily, has been able to maintain its price 
schedule almost intact. The price of steel rails has been $43 
a ton for years; it has remained unchanged all through the 
present depression, until two months ago when it was reduced 
to $40. It is easy to imagine how low steel prices would have 
fallen had the steel industry kept operating at full capacity I 
But that is exactly what agriculture has done. During the 
years 1926-1932 the total output of farm products in the United 
States has remained practically constant, at a level about 15 
percent higher than during the years 1919-1921.' In the face 
of a reduction in demand, agriculture has continued to operate 
its plant at full capacity. This is the second reason why agri-
cultural prices have declined so heavily during the past three 
years. 
Changes Within. Agriculture 
There is a further consideration, though it is not connected 
with the depression. Changes have been taking place in the 
technique of agricultural production, and these changes have 
been slowly altering the outlines of the agricultural picture. 
Some of these changes have helped the United States farmer, 
some of them have hurt him. The increased use of tractors, 
trucks, combines and other large scale machinery has helped 
to the extent that it has reduced the costs of production on the 
farm. Yet these tractors and trucks have displaced many 
horses and mules; and as a result, a good-sized portion of the 
market for eorn, oats and other feed grains has disapp~ared. 
This has correspondingly weakened the prices of these grains. 
Whatever their net effect may be, these changes work slowly, 
and they are of small moment compared with the terrific decline 
in agricultural prices that has taken place during the past three 
years. This decline bears down with great severity upon farm 
operators, because the costs of running a farm-debt and inter-
est charges, taxes, machinery costs and the multitude of small 
running expenses-have not come down in any corresponding 
measure with the prices of farm products. The farmer's income 
has been reduced 60 percent, but his e:cpenses have been reduced 
only about 20 percent.8 The farmer is ground between the 
upper millstone of descending prices and the unyielding lower 
millstone of comparatively fixed costs. 
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WHY HAS THE GENERAL PRICE LEVEL DECLINED? 
It is easy to say that the immediate cause of the present agri-
cultural emergency is the great decline that has taken place in 
the general price level during the past three years. But that 
only raises another and more difficult question. What was it 
that made the general price level declineT 
The answer to this question is full of controversial points, 
but the broad outlines can be blocked out in a few pages. 
The root causes of the present depression and deflation of 
prices trace back to the World War. 
Before the war, monetary conditions were comparatively 
stable, both within each nation and between the nations. The 
leading nations played the parts for which they were fitted, 
and these parts dovetailed with one another to make a well 
balanced whole. 
The United States, for example, was the world's greatest 
debtor nation. That is, she paid huge amounts annually to 
other nations for interest on borrowed money, for tourist expen-
ditures and for immigrant remittances abroad. She was also 
a great net exporter of goods. These two policies,'her financial 
policy and her trade policy, litted in well with each other, for 
her payments abroad were made in the form of her exports 
of goods.0 
Great Britain, on the other hand, was the world's chief 
banker and creditor nation. Other nations paid her large 
amounts every year for interest on borrowed money and for 
shipping charges. Furthermore, she was a free-trade nation 
and received large net imports of goods. Here was another 
example of harmonious financial and trade policies. 
Between the nations, equilibrium was maintained through 
the action of "the automatic gold flow mechanism." If one 
nation, for example, developed an export surplus of goods, 
services and loans abroad, this excess would cause that nation"'s 
exchange rates to rise, and gold would flow in until the ex-
changes were corrected. This inflo\v of gold would raise prices 
in that nation and make it harder for her to sell her goods and 
services abroad and easier for other nations to sell to her. This 
would reduce her exports to a point where they would again 
be balanced by her imports. Gold flowed wherever needed to 
redress balances, and in flowing raised or lowered prices so 
that equilibrium was maintained. 
Beneath the surface of this. apparently smoothly working 
world, however, politico-economic forces-population growth 
the ambitions of the different nations for control of the world·~ 
markets and productive resources, etc.-were exerting terrific 
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expansive pressure. The world was like a smoothly running 
steam engine, but the boiler pressure was so high that the 
machine was likely to blow up at any time. When the explo-
sion finally to'ok place in 1914, it threw the different parts of 
the machine out of relation with each other, and set up oppos-
ing forces which have led to a breakdown during the last 
three years. 
The Effects of the War 
Let us try to get a clear grasp of the nature of these opposing 
forces, set against each other as a result of the war explosion. 
The belligerent nations could h~ve financed the war either 
by monetary inflation or by heavy taxation. Disregarding the 
advice of economists, the United States, along with the other 
nations, chose inflation, and thereby sowed the seeds of our 
present trouble. 
As a result of this policy of inflation, prices during the war 
roughly doubled. For four years, from 1917 to 1920, the gen-
eral level of commodity. prices at wholesale in the United States 
ranged between 175 nnd 225 perce~t of pre-war. 
When peace was declared in 1919, our heavy expenditures 
for war purposes declined, but they were replaced for a time 
by heavy purchases by foreign nations who were recuperating 
from the destructive effects of the war. The war-time scale of 
production and prices continued for more than a year after the 
war had ended. 
Then, in 1920, the war and post-war boom came to an end. 
Foreign nations ceased buying from abroad and began to build 
up their own industries; governments ceased floating their war 
bonds, and the policy of cheap money was ended. Prices 
crashed, and a severe depression ensued. 
The depression was severe, hut it was comparatively brief. 
'Vithin a year or two the country began to recover. Industry 
struggled to it.'i feet again, and began to proceed, haltingly at 
first. :Most of the price and debt maladjustments carrying over 
from the war inflation period were reduced, some by the expira-
tion of contracts, others by default, others by voluntary agree-
ment, and others by the gradual action of competition. But 
many maladjustments remained, and although industry was 
able to overcome her obstacles within a year or two recovery 
in agriculture was slow. ' 
The United States Changes from Debtor to Creditor 
Prosperity returned to industry by 1923. The United States 
greatly improved the technique of mass production, thereby 
reducing the costs of industrial production, and embarked upon 
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an aggressive policy of expanding its exports. Overriding the 
protest of economists, it also decided to raise its tariffs and 
keep out foreign manufactured goods. We were not alone in 
this; the movement was, with the exception of England, world-
wide. But we were one of the worst sinners in this respect, for 
we were a large nation and had large world responsibilities. 
Then, from 1924 on, a strange new influence began to make 
itself felt in the world. During the war, the European nations 
had borrowed enormous sums of money from the United States 
to finance their fighting forces. These foreign borrowings were 
so great that they reversed the debtor position of the United 
States. When the war was over, the United States emerged, 
not as the world's largest debtor, but as one of the world's 
leading creditors. 
This change in the world position of the United States meant 
that she would be receiving huge payments every year instead 
of making them. These payments to the United States would 
have to be made in goods or services, or else in gold. Our tar-
iff, raised higher in 1922, made it difficult for goods to enter. 
So gold flowed in instead. It flowed in so rapidly that the 
stocks of gold in this country increased from roughly 2 billion 
dollars in 1914 to 4 billion in 1923.10 
It then became clear that the United States' new role as 
banker conflicted with her traditional role as a large exporter 
of goods. Her new financial policy ran counter to her estab-
lished trade policy. For as a banker, she required huge pay~ 
ments to be made to her each year-nearly 200 million dollars 
annually in governmental war debts alone.11 At first these 
payments could be made in gold. But there is only a limited 
supply of gold in the world, and sooner or later goods would 
have to flow in instead. The United States would have to be-
come a net importer of goods. But that ran directly counter 
to her trade and tariff policy, which aimed to make the United 
States a large net exporter of goods. 
Europe Pays Her Debts by Borrowing More 
There wns ihe situation, and it would quickly have brought 
about a deadlock in world affairs had not a new element sud-
denly entered the picture. European nations began to float 
huge issues of securities-stocks and bonds-in the United 
States. In other words, we in the United States started to lend 
vast sums abroad. We demanded that the European countries 
pay their debts, and pay them in gold, not goods. And when 
they could not pay us any longer, '\'e loaned them the money to 
do it. We loaned them so much money that they were able to 
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pay their debts and buy large quantities of goods from us as 
well. The amounts are shown in table I. 
TABLE I. AMERICAN EXPORTS, I:UPORTS A.ND FOREIGN LOANS12 
In milliom of dollan 
1922 .••••...•••••••••• 
1112.'J •••••••••••..•••• 
1924 ••..•••.•••.••••• 
1925 ••••.•..••..•••.• 
1926 •••••••••••...• :. 
1927 •••••••••••••••.• 
1928 •••••••.•••••••.• 
11129 •••••••••••••••••. 
1930 •••••••••••••••••• 
1931 .••••.•..••.•••••. 
1932•• ••••.••••...••.. 
•I.e., new foreign loan.a. 
*-Ffra~ nine months. 
Exports 
S3,832 
4,168 
4,591 
4,910 
4,808 
4,865 
5,128 
6,241 
3,843 
2,424 
1,189 
Imports 
S3,ll3 
3,792 
3,610 
4,227 
4,4.'Jl 
4,185 
4,091 
4,.199 
3,061 
2,091 
1,016 
Exlll.ln or 
New forel..tn 
aecurltle• 
exports sotdln u. s.• 
• 719 s 6.'JO 376 267 
981 1,047 
683 1,078 
377 1,145 
680 l,562 
l,0.17 l,.'Jl9 
842 769 
782 1,010 
333 255 
174 0 
Our foreign loans were not part of the financial policy of the 
United States. They were independent transactions, made by 
business men and bankers as part of their ordinary investment 
activities. Foreign corporations sold bonds to finance their 
business, and we bought them in huge amounts. It was ob-
vious that these loans could not continue indefinitely. But 
while they lasted they balanced the international books and 
financed a period of insecure but very exuberant prosperity in 
the United States. . 
The huge stocks of gold in this country would have given us 
a very high price level had not a good deal of the gold been 
"sterilized," sunk in the vaults of the Federal Reserve Banks, 
so that it could not exert its full effect on prices. This pre-
vented the "gold flow mechanism" from working. Had we 
and France left it free to work; it would have redistributed the 
gold where it was needed in other countries. As it was, the 
majority of the world's gold piled up in the United States and 
France. Our price level evened out at about 50 percent higher 
than pre-war. 
Similar price levels prevai1ed abroad, but for a different rea-
son. Their stocks of gold were small; but this did not depress 
their prices, because their gold stocks were 10 small that the 
countries were forced to remain off the gold standard. Fur-
thermore, our loans abroad helped to sustain foreign purchas-
ing power and foreign price )evels. 
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The Period of Prosperity 
Gradually, industrial prosperity in the United States devel-
oped into a boom. Our indexes of industrial production rose 
above 1923-1925 levels by 8 percent, 12 percent and finally 
19 percent. Installment buying became wide-spread, and spec-
ulation in the security markets developed on an amazing scale. 
Throughout this period the commodity price level remained 
fairly even. After 1925, however, points of weakness began to 
develop. Gold stocks in the United States and France contin-
ued to grow. Economic nationalism ran rampant, not only 
among the leading nations of the world but also among the 
small new European nations set up by the Versailles peace 
treaty. Expenditures for competitive armaments mounted rap-
idly. Partly to rest.ore sound monetary conditions, but also 
partly to build up a war chest of gold, nation after nation re-
turned to the gold standard. Germany went on the gold basis 
in the fall of 1924; England and the Netherlands in April, 1925; 
Belgium, in October, 1926; Italy, December, 192i; and France, 
June, 1928.13 
The return of these nations to the gold basis increased the 
demand for gold. This increase in the demand for gold began 
to increase the value of the yellow metal. An "increase in the 
value of gold" is the same thing as "a decrease in the (gold) 
value of goods;'' that is, it is the same thing as a decline in 
prices. In the four-year period from early 1925 to early 1929, 
the level of prices abroad, in the countries that take the bulk of 
our farm-product exports, declined about 12 percent.H 
Besides the general scramble for gold, there was an almost 
universal move in the direction of higher tariffs. Nations 
fought to protect their own producers from foreign competition 
by raising tariff barriers against imports. And many a na-
tional government, hard pressed to balance the budget, levied 
additional import duties in an attempt to increase its income. 
Trouble was brewing in agriculture particularly. Wheat pro-
duction was expanding rapidly in Canada and Argentina. Ex-
pansion in these countries subjected our wheat growers to the 
same ruthless competition that we gave European wheat grow-
ers two or three generations ago. After 1924, too, Russia loomed 
on the horizon with threats of further additions to the world's 
wheat supply. 
Uncertainty Develops 
Gradually, these shifts in production, combined with the 
changes being made in financial and trade policies, began to lmve 
their effect upon the markets of the world. Rising tariff barriers 
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cut down the demand for goods. Our foreign loans began to 
slacken. Reduced demand led to a piling up of stocks of raw 
materials. These large stocks began to bear down on prices. 
These falling prices, in turn, led to more restrictive import poli-
cies and to further reduction in demand. 
"By the end of 1928, mounting supplies of industrial goods in 
relation to limited monetary and credit facilities were endanger-
ing commodity price levels, and in 1929 that danger was made 
even more real as the tremendous absorption of more and more 
funds in the American speculative markets reduced our lending 
abroad, and as the lure of speculative profits dragged even for-
eign funds into the American stock markets. At that juncture, 
the end of 1928 and the beginning of 1929, European industrial 
conditions became vulnerable to the subsequent crash in world-
wide speculation and the unsettling influences that the crash let 
loose. " 14 
It was not until 1929 that the truth seemed to become apparent. 
Only then did the 'vorld seem to grasp the fact that nations can-
not sell without buying, nor repay loans indefinitely by simply 
borrowing more. The large stocks of goods began to cause con· 
cern, and industrial production began to slacken. This wa'! a 
disturbing sign. Confidence gave way to caution. Previously, 
domestic demand had been overexpanded by installment buy-
ing now it contracted ns people turned from buying to saving. 
This contraction of demand caused production to contract 
still further. The stock market wavered and then crashed, 
feverish optimism turned into uncertainty and then into pessi-
mism, and the depression began. · 
The Depression Begins 
When depression begins, it feeds on itself to breed more 
depression. 
"The interrelated developments, once the depression began, 
can be more clearly traced, and their influence on agriculture 
more clearly visualized. It is generaUy agreed that since the 
decline in 1929 there have been three distinct phases in the de-
pression: The first embraced the two years up to the spring of 
1931; it brought on a series of monetary disturbances which 
characterized the second period, from the middle of 1931 t-0 the 
spring of 1932; the third is the current period characterized by 
the measure adopted to stem the financial debacle. 
''The downward course of the depression during 1930 and 1931 
led to a financial crisis. Debtor countries found it difficult to 
maintain satisfactory trade balances to meet their foreign obliga-
tions and to secure new loans upon which they hacl been de-
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pendent for several years. To protect their currencies in relation 
to gold, these countries were forced to adopt exchange regulations 
to restrict gold exports. Doubt then arose as to the financial 
soundness of creditor countries, followed by runs on money mar-
kets. Great Britain, in September, 1931, was forced to abandon 
the gold standard. In quick succession other countries, covering 
about half the globe, followed its example. Creditor countries, 
chiefly the United States and France, unwilling either to loan 
more money or to import goods, attracted large quantities of gold 
from the rest of the world bringing about a still greater 'mal-
distribution' of the world's gold supply. 
''In the United States bank failures reached enormous propor-
tions and led to hoarding by the frightened public. Investors 
also lost confidence in practically all forms of securities, the 
prices of which fell to unheard of levels, and the flotation of new 
securities practically ceased. Bank deposits were drawn down. 
Banks, fearing more runs, restricted credit, and commodity prices 
continued to fall. At the end of 1931, commodity prices at 
wholesale had returned to the pre-war level. 
''The United States, in its efforts to stem the tide of depression, 
by the summer of 1932 had made fundamental changes in bank-
ing, had legislated into existence new credit institutions with 
vast financial resources, and through the Federal Reserve System 
had supplied open market credit in very large volume. In the in-
ternational field, the leading countries of the world were endeav-
oring to find a basis for cooperation in political and economic 
affairs, that would help stabilize financial conditions and restore 
the flow of trade. 
''The developments of the past three years have resulted in a 
drastic decline in the demand for the products of our farms, both 
in this country and in foreign countries, but production, in the 
aggregate, has not been materially reduced. In some lines pro-
duction has continued to be heavier than the markets will absorb 
even at ruinously. low prices, and burdensome supplies have ac-
cumulated. Although the continuance of production at the pre-
depression level has contributed to the great depths to which 
agricultural prices have fallen, the forces primarily responsible 
for the agricultural depression are found outside of the agricul-
tural industry. 
"In summary, the principal causes of the depression as it 
affects American agriculture may be listed as: (a) ilonetary and 
credit policies during and after the World War, including the 
increased demand for the world's limited supply of gold as many 
nations strove to return the gold as the basis for their currency 
after 1924; (b) over-expansion of production and productive 
capacity in many industries, with an accompanying increase in 
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the volume of indebtedness; (c) the unparalleled orgy of specu-
lation in securities; {d) the trend toward economic self-suffi-
ciency, especially among European nations, which resulted in 
considerable degree from obligations to pay war debts and repa-
rations, and from efforts to escape the effects of falling prices 
and which was manifested in trade barriers and import restric-
tions that retarded international trade and curtailed the foreign 
demand for our agricultural products. " 15 
PLANNING THE WAY OUT 
There, briefly, is the story of how we got into our present 
trouble. How does it help us in planning the way out f 
First of all, it makes clear that this depression was not '' inevi-
table;" it was not some occult phenomenon, beyond the power 
of man to forestall. It was man-made, the result of policies 
consciously chosen and deliberately carried out. 
To begin with, the war was not a stroke of Fate, falling upon a 
hapless world. Pol~cies could have been adopted which would 
have maintained peace; instead, p9licies were chosen, which, 
when followed to their conclusion, brought on the war. 
During the war, the policy of inflation was not inescapable; 
it was chosen; other methods of financing the war could have 
been used. After the war, the victor nations chose to exact 
reparations with one hand, and with the other put up t.ariffs 
which made payment impossible except in gold. Not until the 
resulting drain of gold wrecked the financial structure of Europe 
has substantial progress been made toward a solution of this 
situation. · 
In the United States, t.arifl walls were raised in 1922 and again 
in 1930. Here again the choice was deliberately made; we put 
our tariffs up, despite the fact that a nation can be a large net 
exporter, or a leading world financier and creditor, but it cannot 
be both at once. 
A world disaster which is the result of wrong policies can be 
rectified by right policies. Our economic machine is badly dam-
aged, because we drove it into the ditch; but it can be repaired 
and put in the running again. 
What part can we play in this general reconstruction T 
The first thing we can do is to put our own house in order. 
And while we are doing this, it will pay us to remember that ours 
is not the only house on the lot. It will do us no good to clean 
up and dump our rubbish in our neighbor's yard, if that leads 
him to dump as much or more of his rubbish in our yard in 
return. 
This consideration need not hamper our actions. It means 
only that our plans should be laid with reference to the rest of 
the world as well as to our own country, not for reasons of altru-
ism, but simply for our own good. 
Remedial Policies 
Our brief study has shown us that agriculture is sufl;ering from 
extremely low prices and relatively high costs. It has shown 
further that the reasons for low agricultural prices are: (I) the 
decline in the general commodity price levels; (2) the lag in the 
costs of distribution from producer to consumer; and (3) con-
tinued high production of agricultural products, in the face of a 
reduced demand. 
It seems evident, then, that in mapping out policies to meet the 
agricultural emergency we can develop several lines of attack. 
One line takes us in the direction of "reflation," in an attempt 
to raise the general commodity price level toward pre-depression 
levels. This 'vould raise agricultural prices to the point where 
the majority of farmers would be able to make ends meet. It 
would equalize prices and costs by raising prices. 
Another line regards pre-depression price levels ~ past and 
gone beyond recall. Those who hold this point of view believe 
that costs of all kinds-freight rates, debt and interest charges, 
taxes, rents, wages, etc.-should be "deflated" in line with the, 
deflation of the general commodity price le\·el. This would tend 
toward the equalization of prices and costs by reducing costs. 
A third line of attack takes a direction different from either of 
the first two. It does not attempt to raise the general price level, 
nor to "deflate" costs; it aims to raise agricultural prices only 
by limiting the amount of the product that can be sold on the 
domestic market. This is called the domestic allotment plan. 
One form of this plan 'vould limit production as well as the 
amount sold domestically. 
This plan will be brought up and discussed in the present ses-
sion of Congress. It is already attracting a great deal of interest, 
and legislative action upon it may presently be forthcoming. 
Accordingly, the next circular in this series of publications will 
deal with the domestic allotment plan. 
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